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A New Direction For Japan
The extraordinary economic gains made by
Japan since World War II have transformed it
into a major economic poweLJapan currently
ranks second among industrialized nations in
the size of its gross domestic product (GDP), and
third in its share of trade among major industrial
countries, behind the u.s. and West Germany.
Japan's success has, however, led to increased
tension in the international trading system. In
particular, there is a widespread perception that
japan's aggressive export growth and its reluc-
tance to expand imports have contributed to the
loss of jobs among its trading partners. Reactions
to Japan's massive trade surplus, which soared
from $2 billion in 1980 to a record $56 billion
in 1985, include rising protectionist sentiment in
the United States and Europe that threatens the
free trade system painstakingly nurtured over the
past four decades.
Japan has responded to these pressures by
lowering tariffs and liberalizing other types of
import restrictions, by encouraging its citizens to
purchase foreign consumer goods, especially
those from the United States, and by enacting
policies designed to increase access by foreign
financial institutions to domestic finance. Yet
despite these measures, japan's external
imbalance continues and protectionist sentiment
abroad is stronger than eveL
Its continued trade imbalance has prompted
Japan to change the focus of its macroeconomic
policies toward increasing domestic spending.
"The Report of the Advisory Group on Eco-
nomic Structural Adjustment for International
Harmony," otherwise known as the Maekawa
Report released April 7, 1986, calls for a major
restructuring of the Japanese economy. Its issue
has raised the expectation that japan is seriously
considering policies that will fundamentally
change its postwar economic philosophy. This
Letter discusses the Maekawa report, its potential
implications, and the likelihood that Japan will
fundamentally restructure its economy to reduce
its trade surplus.
The Maekawa Report
In late October 1985, Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone asked that a nongovernmental
advisory committee, chaired by ML Haruo
Maekawa, the former Governor ofthe Bank of
Japan, formulate a set of medium and long-term
policy recommendations concerning Japan's
economic and social structure that would,
among other things, reduce trade frictions with
the rest ofthe world.
Whereas Japan's post-war policies were
designed to support industrialization, export-led
economic growth, and a high household saving
rate, the Report recognizes that the goals estab-
lished soon after the war have been achieved.
According to the Report, japan has reached a
stage of economic maturity that now requires a
reduced dependence on exports, more imports
from the rest ofthe world, a greater allocation of
resources to improve the quality of life, and a
greater contribution toward solving major world
problems such as the debt problem of develop-
ing countries. Achieving these goals would
lower Japan's large trade surplus and foster more
harmonious relations within the world economy.
The Report offers a set of policy recommenda-
tions to achieve these goals. First, it calls for
expanded domestic demand to replace exports
as the major drivingforce ofthe economy. Spe-
cifically, it recommends stimulating domestic
demand by increasing government expenditures,
reforming taxes (to stimulate housing and to
lower the savings rate, in particular), and
restructuring labor market conditions, such as
reducing working hours to increase leisure time
and hence consumption.
Second, the Report recommends a restructuring
of production away from manufacturing toward
the service sector, increased reliance on foreign
suppliers to contribute more than raw materials
to domestic production, and increased direct
investment by Japanese firms in other countries.
In addition, it states that import restrictions on
agricultural products should be relaxed so thatFRBSF
existing land use may be shifted from agriculture
to housing.
Third, to improve market access by foreign pro-
ducers further and to encourage imports of man-
ufactured goods, the Report calls for restructur-
ing the complex set of tariffs, import quotas,
standards and certification, and government pro-
curement policies now in existence.
Fourth, the Report states that Japan and the other
major trading countries must make greater
efforts in their domestic policies - improving
the coordination oftheir monetary and fiscal
policies in particular - to ensure that exchange
rates remain stable and in line with economic
fundamentals.
Fifth, fiscal policy in the major industrial coun-
tries, according to the Report, should be bal-
anced over time, with governments making
efforts to reduce their reliance on debt-financ-
ing. Sixth, the Report reaffirms the commitment
to international liberalization ofJapanese
finance and the need to implement more pol-
icies that provide a more direct connection
between international and domestic finance.
Finally, the Report urges Japan to take a more
active role in the world economy to alleviate the
debt problem of developing countries and to
promote economic and technological coopera-
tion, especially with developing countries.
Implications
The Maekawa Report is of interest to foreign
observers principally because of its potential
effects on economic relations with Japan. We
will focus on the recommendations that seek to
reduce the Japanese trade surplus.
The net exports ofJapan, or any other country,
reflect, among other things, the balance between
the domestic supply of savings on the one hand
and the demand for those savings to finance
domestic investment and deficits in the public
sector on the other. When the supply of savings
exceeds domestic demand, the excess savings
are invested abroad. This is true for Japan at
present, and it means that Japan must be a net
exporter. As a net saver, Japan buys fewer goods
from abroad than foreigners buy from Japan. The
counterpart to Japan's excess supply of savings is
the excess demand for those savings among its
trading partners. When the demand for domestic
savings exceeds the supply, as in the United
States, the country in question incurs an external
deficit.
Although Japan has enjoyed external surpluses
during most ofthe past two decades, the mas-
sive surpluses now causing so much concern are
a recent phenomenon. They result from a high
and relatively stable Japanese savings rate along
with a significant drop in the demand for financ-
ing domestic investment and the public sector.
Gross savings as a percentage ofJapan's GDP
stabilized in the neighborhood of 31 percent
between 1979 and 1984 - the highest savings
rate among the major OEeD countries. In con-
trast, gross fixed capital formation has fallen
from 32 percent of GDP in 1979 to 28 percent
in 1984, while the general government fiscal
deficit has dropped from nearly 5 percent of
GDP in 1979 to 2.7 percent in 1984. During this
period, the current external balance as a per-
centage of GDP shifted from a deficit of nearly 1
percent in 1979 to an unprecedented surplus of
3 percent in 1984.
Over the same period, the current external defi-
cit of the United States increased from 0.1 per-
cent to 2.6 percent of GDP because of a decline
in the savings rate and an increase in the gov-
ernment deficit. Thus, a significant portion of the
excess supply of savings in Japan was matched
by an excess demand for savings in the U.5.
The Maekawa Report proposes to reduce Japan's
external surplus by simultaneously reducing the
supply of savings and increasing investment
spending. Saving would be reduced by tax and
labor market reforms that increase consumption
and leisure time. Investment spending would be
stimulated specifically through tax incentives
that favor the housing sector.
While these steps should, in principle, reduce
Japan's trade surplus, there are constraints to
their implementation. For example, the house-
hold sector's saving pattern and long-established
cultural attitudes suggest that the Japanese may
not be very responsive to economic incentives
to reduce their rate of savings. In addition, the
availability of only limited social security bene-
fits will remain a great incentive for the Japanese
to save. Although still high in comparison to
other countries, gross savings as a percentage of
GDP in Japan have already declined 9 percent
from a peak of 40 percent in 1970. While the
aging population should generate a further
decline in savings, this will occur too slowly to
rectify the current external imbalance.On the spending side, Japan is understandably
reluctant to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy
because of the fear that it might increase its fis-
cal deficit. Due to large deficit spending in the
1970s, the ratio of general gross government
debt to GOP in Japan in 1985 was already a
high 70 percent - second only to Italy's 99 per-
cent among OEeD countries, and well above
the United States' 48 percent.
It may also be difficult to stimulate additional
investment spending in Japan because there has
been an increasing tendency for Japanese capital
toflowabroad since 1973. The first oil price
shock, which adversely affected the productivity
of capital in Japan encouraged the Japanese to
invest abroad. This capital outflow was rein-
forced by the desire to avoid potential trade
barriers, the liberalization ofJapanese financial
markets and, more recently, the appreciation of
the yen. Furthermore, it reflected the demand for
Japanese savings abroad, notably to finance U.s.
federal budget deficits.
Government policy in Japan has traditionally
favored the manufacturing sector, as shown by
the increase in that sector's real share of GOP
from 30 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 1982.
In contrast, the real share of services and con-
struction in GOP remained roughly the same at
33 percent in 1982 as in 1970. By focusing on
investment in services and housing, the Report
targets areas that have received less attention
and which therefore offer significant growth
potential.
The development of services and housing would
also improve the quality of life in Japan's popu-
lation. However, while there is a general recog-
nition within Japan that a reallocation of
resources towards housing in particular is over-
due, the Report is not necessarily advocating a
full-fledged "u.s. model" in which government
programs and the tax code provide important
incentives to own a home. Budget constraints, as
well as the limited availability of land, may limit
the pace ofJapanese housing development.
In addition to issues of feasibility and effective-
ness, the Report's recommended policies involve
costs to Japan and the world economy. The
attempt to lower the rate of savings in Japan will
limit the availability of capital to finance invest-
ment spending in Japan and other regions of the
world. This would raise world interest rates,
reduce world economic growth and, possibly,
make resolution of the international debt prob-
lem more difficult.
Impacton government policy
The first U.S. accounts of the Maekawa Report
frequently gave the impression that it reflected
new national goals that would soon be imple-
mented. This is incorrect. The Report was pre-
pared by a nongovernmental advisory group. It
did not explicitly involve either the major gov-
ernmental agencies or parliament. In Japan, it
has already been criticized for being too bold
and for failing to incorporate a sufficiently
representative range of views. Those familiar
with the arduous process of decision-making by
consensus in Japan will recognize that the
absence of an imprimatur, particularly from the
government, makes the Report vulnerable to
criticism.
Second, the Report is viewed in some Japanese
circles as a reaction to U.s. pressure and Prime
Minister Nakasone's commitment to President
Reagan to deal with the trade issue. In the opin-
ion of some observers, this may limit serious
consideration of the policy recommendations
simply because, in their view, direct U.S. pres-
sure cannot resolve the basic economic issues
dividing the two countries. Such a viewpoint,
however, does not consider the broader implica-
tions ofthe Report.
While the Report's recommendations are not
likely to be implemented soon, they reflect a
growing awareness that impatience with Japan's
large and continuing external surplus threatens
the world trading system from which Japan has
benefited so greatly. They also reflect the real-
ization that timely changes in economic policies
are needed to defuse protectionist sentiment
among Japan's trading partners. Thus, the adop-
tion of measures addressing the international
concerns that prompted the Maekawa Report
should prove to be in Japan's own self-interest.
However, achieving a more balanced world
trading environmentwill be difficult unless
Japan's major trading partners (particularly the
U.s.) take steps to reduce their own domestic
spending.
Thomas F. Cargill and Ramon Moreno
Opinionsexpressed in this newsletterdo not necessarily reflect the views ofthe managementofthe Federal Reserve Bank ofSan
Francisco,orofthe Board of Governorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorial commentsmaybe addressed totheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....Freecopiesof Federal Reservepublications
can beobtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,San Francisco
94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.uo~6u!450m 40~n U060JO 0POA0U





BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 201,317 112 9,616 5.0
Loans and Leases1 6 182,782 456 9,545 5.5
Commercial and Industrial 52,438 207 249 0.4
Real estate 66,603 - 86 3,340 5.2
Loans to Individuals 39,222 92 4,984 14.5
Leases 5,633 3 254 4.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,736 - 325 - 748 - 6.5
Other Securities2 7,799 - 19 819 11.7
Total Deposits 207,511 4,259 8,593 4.3
Demand Deposits 54,283 3,240 6,017 12.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,387 2,787 5,482 17.7
OtherTransaction Balances4 16,713 983 2,620 18.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,515 37 - 43 0.0
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,794 253 2,799 6.3
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000 or more 35,848 - 326 - 2,469 - 6.4
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 21,671 -1,260 - 873 - 3.8
TwoWeek Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l{Deficiency(-l
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change